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The Establishment of the State-Owned Yawata Steel Works (1)
　　  The Integrated Steel Works That Promoted Japan’s Industrialisation 
When the Country Entered the Modern Industrial World as a Latecomer
Norikazu  Shimizu
Translated by Michiyo Sakamoto Stark
* note:  “The Imperial Steel Works” or “The State-
Owned Steel Yawata Works” is refered to “The 
Yawata Works” in general hereafter.
SUMMARY
The introduction of Western-type iron-making spurted toward the end 
of the Edo period.  The ‘Westen Impact’ symbolised by the outbreak of 
the Opium War in China and the arrival of ‘Black ships’ forced Japan 
to build reverberatory furnaces for producing ‘Warships and Cannons’. 
An engineering book published in Holland was translated into 
Japanese. Based on it, Japan’s first reverberatory furnace was 
constructed in Saga Clan, and those derived from this furnace spread 
to 11 areas across the nation.  This development laid the groundwork 
for Japan to replace the conventional ‘Tatara’ method with the 
Western-style charcoal blast furnace.
After Meiji Restoration, there were three ‘State-owned Works’, such as 
those in Kamaishi, Nakaosaka and Hiroshima, and unfortunately, 
these works resulted in failure for the reason of low productivity.  In 
Kamaishi Mines, Tanaka Ironworks, which sold to a private sector, 
continued its operation in an insignificant size of Oshima-style’s small 
blast furnaces. Meanwhile, steel-making at arsenals was experimentally 
tried.
In order to meet the increasing demand for steel, a first draft to be 
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proposed to the Diet in 1892 was prepared by the Ministry of the 
Imperial Japanese Navy. The Diet refused it because sufficient research 
on raw materials had not been conducted. The government accordingly 
set up a committee for conducting research on undertaking iron and 
steel making and on technical experiments as well.
A major turning point in this national undertaking was the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War. In Feb. 1895, the House of Representatives of 
the Imperial Diet adopted “Plan to Construct State-run Iron Works” for 
the first time. Although “The Launch Plan” with the budget of about 4 
millions yen to build the Works in Yahata was decided, it was 
significantly amended as a result of research on advanced steel-making 
technology in western countries conducted by Michitaro Oshima, the 
first main technological officer. In the revised plan, it was emphasised 
that Japan should become internationally competitive to expand the 
operational scale of the plant and eliminate unnecessary expenses. In 
response to the requirements of the emerging “steel era”, it was 
required that no wrought iron should be produced.Since the production 
of military grade steel was “the most difficult challenge”, it was 
postponed until  later days. For these reasons, the up-to-date and 
suitable technology for manufacturing diverse types of steel materials 
was introduced from Germany, especially from a company named 
Gutehoffnungshutte A.G.(GHH). 15 German engineers and foremen 
were hired. Under the supervision of German experts, Japanese 
engaged in plant construction, machine installation, and then 
operating plants. The Yawata Works started not only as “a integrated 
work” of iron, steel, and rolling products, but also as “a compound 
company” which provided raw materials such as iron ores, coal and so 
on.
In Feb. 1901 blow-in was accomplished at the No.1 blast furnace. On 
November 18, 1901, a magnificent inauguration ceremony was held to 
celebrate the grand opening of “The Imperial Steel Works” in Yahata. 
However, the machines and equipments could not be operated smoothly 
for the reason of a financial shortage. The blast furnace performed 
poorly due to low quality coking coke. The government ordered the 
suspension of the blast furnace and the converter operations for 
“economic reasons”. The way the Yawata Works should be implemented 
was thoroughly reexamined by “The Council” which the government set 
up.
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The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War contributed to the restart of 
the Works. After additional investments and discharges of foreign 
engineers and foremen, Kageyoshi Noro was invited as a special 
adviser. Noro reformed the blast design and improved coke-making. As 
a result of these success, the operation improved steadily. The Yawata 
Works accordingly managed continuous production. It moved forward 
and “Phase 1 of the Plant Extension Project” commenced, so that it 
accomplished 180,000 tons of steel products per annum. Through this 
achievement, its account turned to make profits for the first time in 
1910.
The Yawata Works achieved and maintained autonomy through the 
process of technological transfer. The problem, however, was that the 
speed of Japan’s industrialisation and the increase in demand were 
much higher than the pace of increase in production capacity of the 
Yawata Works. The “Phase II Extension Project” was continuously 
prepared.
Prior to World War II, as far as the construction of modern integrated 
milsl in Asia was concerned, the Han-yang Iron and steel works, the 
first blow-in, was established in China in 1894, several years earlier 
than the Yawata, and the Tata iron and steel Co. in India started in 
1911, ten years after the Yawata. Comparing with these three Works, 
we clearly recognize two unique and superior features of the Yawata 
Works. They are the following points: (1) technology transfer with 
autonomy, and (2) contribution to progress in both national and local 
industrialisation.
Keywords
The integrated Steel Works     The Tawata Works
technological transfer     industrialisation     the foregn engineer
Japan’s industrialisation spurted when the country faced the over-
whelming power of western civilisation, symbolised by the arrival of 
Commodore Perry’s black ships at Shimoda Port and the outbreak of 
the Opium War in China.  Japan was amazed at the sight of the mili-
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tary superiority and material civilisation of western countries.  It 
feared their power and felt intimidated, a feeling which propelled the 
country’s maximum endeavour to catch up with the west as quickly as 
possible.  Japan launched a major national initiative to develop mili-
tary forces.  Included in that scheme was the manufacture of cast-iron 
guns and steam-powered naval vessels in order to protect territorial 
rights.  To achieve these goals, Japan decided to learn and introduce 
modern steel making technology from the west.
An engineering book was imported from abroad and translated into 
Japanese.  Based on the contents of that book, Japan’s first reverbera-
tory furnace was constructed in Saga Clan in Kyushu.  Using the cast 
iron from that plant, cannon and other artillery production commenced 
(1852).  This gave significant momentum to the Japanese iron and steel 
making industry.  Takato Oshima launched iron ore smelting  in Ohashi 
in northern Japan, where a western-style charcoal blast furnace was 
blown in for the first time in Japan (1854).  This development laid the 
groundwork for Japan to replace the conventional “Tatara” method 
with the modern iron and steel making technology developed in the 
west.  In the Meiji Restoration and onward, the Japanese government 
deepened their understanding that the strength of western superpow-
ers derived from their “coal and steel” industry.  In order to modernise 
Japan, a state undertaking called “Rich Nation and Strong Army” was 
started along with a “Civilisation and Enlightenment” scheme.  Domes-
tic iron and steel production was acknowledged as the ground of mod-
ern nation building.  The Ministry of Public Works was founded in 
1870, and took the initiative in furthering domestic iron and steel pro-
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duction before its abolition in Dec. 1885.  The Ministry took over and 
further nurtured Japan’s industrialisation programme, which had been 
initiated by the Tokugawa Shogunate as well as local clan governments 
before the Meiji Restoration.  Under the Meiji administration, the “pro-
motion of modern technology and industry” was strongly recommended 
and implemented as a high priority.  Specified in the agenda was indus-
trial development including shipbuilding, mining, iron and steel mak-
ing, railways and communications.  The Ministry exercised leadership 
in Japan’s infrastructure development.  Unfortunately, however, all 
those projects failed to become economically viable.  They had to be 
“disposed of” in the end, through being sold to the private sector.  There 
were three state-owned iron works in those days, namely Hiroshima 
Iron Works (1875~1905), Kamaishi Iron Works in Iwate (1873~1882) 
and Nakaosaka Iron Works in Gunma (1878~1881).  Hiroshima aimed 
to improve the conventional “Tatara” method, for which purpose it emu-
lated the French sand-iron smelting method.   The other two iron works 
introduced innovative technology from the United Kingdom, which had 
been developed during the Industrial Revolution.  The British engineer-
ing method consisted of the blast furnace process (which was fuelled by 
charcoal in Japan), the hot blast stove process (pig iron making), the 
puddling furnace process (refining) and the rolling mill process 
(wrought iron products).  After ownership of the Kamaishi Iron Works 
passed from the state to private hands, its charcoal blast furnace tech-
nology was inherited by Kamaishi Mines Tanaka Iron Works.  In 1905, 
under the supervision of Kageyoshi Noro, a great Japanese pioneer in 
ferrous metallurgy, Japan’s first coke blast furnace was blown in suc-
cessfully at that plant. 
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Meanwhile new developments were taking place in the west around 
1880.  The world was shifting from the “iron era” to the “steel era”. 
During the Franco-Prussian War, the superiority of the Krupp steel 
guns used by the Prussian military forces was firmly established.  Giv-
en that evidence, the Japanese government strengthened its commit-
ment to increasing pig iron and steel production at arsenals adjunct to 
the Imperial military.  Japan aspired to expanding steel production, 
starting with Krupp crucible steel and then moving forward to the open 
hearth furnace system.  The Japanese navy succeeded in the production 
of Krupp crucible steel in 1882, followed by another success in 1893 by 
the army.  Although the open hearth furnace project began in 1890, the 
phase prior to the Sino-Japanese War was simply “experimental”. 
However, as railway construction made progress in Japan, steel im-
ports increased, exceeding the threshold of 100,000 metric tons in 1890. 
In order to fulfil the increasing demand for steel, while the world was 
moving toward the “steel era”, various plans were prepared and pub-
lished.  A first draft was prepared by the Ministry of the Imperial Japa-
nese Navy in 1891, followed by others.  Subsequent to many twists and 
turns, a final plan entitled “Launch Plan for State-run Iron and Steel 
Works” was concluded after the end of the Sino-Japanese War.
Year Budget Pig iron Steel materials
　　　　　　　　　　　(million　  pig
　　　　　　　　　　　　 yen)　 iron　 steel　 products (tons)
Navy’s Plan
Committee
   for Steelmaking
Ad-hoc Committee
Launch Plan
1891
1892
1893
1895
2.25
2.75
3.60
4.09
---
--
60,000
36,000
30,000
60,000
85,000
60,000
Steel 27,500  Wroughtiron 2,000  Crucible 500
Steel 56,000  Wroughtiron 4,000  Crucible1,000
Bessemer 42,000  Martin 42,000  Wroughtiron 9,000
       〃         35,000       〃     20,000             〃            4,500  Crucible 500
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A major turning point in this national undertaking of state-run iron 
works occurred when the Sino-Japanese War broke out.  The declara-
tion of war was in August 1894.  The peace treaty at its end was signed 
in April 1895.  When the war broke out, all cargoes of arms bound for 
Japan were “embargoed” at Singapore.  Faced with this suspension of 
arms imports, Japan experienced enormous difficulties.   There was 
grave concern that “if the war continued too long, the nation would suf-
fer from extreme damage caused by the lack of arms supply.”  This situ-
ation was, in fact, the ultimate decisive factor in persuading the Impe-
rial Diet members, who had been opposed to the bill concerning the 
construction of state-run iron works, to change their minds and endorse 
the scheme.  In Feb. 1895, the House of Representatives of the Imperial 
Diet adopted the “Plan to Construct State-run Iron Works” for the first 
time.  The Plan had been primarily drafted by Kageyoshi Noro some 
time before publication.   Specified in the draft was the following:
1.   While there are many different types, modalities and features of 
steel making technology available today, it would be neither 
easy nor economically viable to try to implement all those differ-
ent methods all at once.  It would be sensible, therefore, that the 
state-run iron works project start on a small scale, then expand 
gradually.
2.   Both pig iron (wrought iron) and steel shall be produced.
3.   Low grade wrought iron shall be produced as a substitute for 
pig iron.  Sand iron, which is abundant in Japan, shall be used 
in the operation.
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constructing site at the Yawata Steel Works, 1896
Map in 1896
The budget for this national programme was passed in the 9th assem-
bly of the Japanese Imperial Diet in 1896.   The government announced 
the state-run iron works project. After some twists and turns in person-
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nel selection, Teiun Yamanouchi was eventually nominated first Chief 
Officer of the State-owned Steel Works.  Michitaro Oshima, the eldest 
son of the abovementioned Takato Oshima, who was an engineering of-
ficial at the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, was nominated first 
Main Technological Officer.  Yamanouchi and Oshima carried out a field 
survey, based on which Yahata in Kyushu was selected as the plant con-
struction site at the end of Oct. 1896.  In those days, four to five metric 
tons of coal were necessary for the production of one ton of steel.  It was 
for this reason that Yahata, located in a coal mining area, was chosen. 
It is worth noting that the State-owned Steel Works at Yahata had a 
different background from Kamaishi in Iwate, which was situated in an 
iron ore mining area.  After the site selection, Oshima went abroad be-
tween Oct. 2, 1896 and Sep. 27, 1897 to research steel making technolo-
gy in western countries.  His mission included a survey of advanced 
steel plant facilities and machinery to prepare for purchases for the 
new plant.  After his return to Japan, in the light of the survey results, 
the original “Launch Plan of State-owned Steel Works” was significant-
ly amended.   In the revised plan, it was emphasised that Japan should 
become internationally competitive in the emerging “steel era”.  It was 
recommended that an integrated plant producing both pig iron and 
steel be constructed and that the most up-to-date technology be intro-
duced from Germany.  The reason was that the German technology was 
the most suitable for manufacturing diverse types of steel materials. 
Oshima commissioned Gutehoffnungshutte A.G. (GHH), a German 
steel and machinery company, to design the plant.  F. W. Luhrmann 
was assigned to the design of the smelter.  R. M. Daelen was commis-
sioned to design steel making and rolling mill processes.  In March 
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1897, ten Japanese engineers were sent to Germany, where they partic-
ipated in a two-year educational course as trainees.  The official sub-
mission of the revised plan was made by Tsunashiro Wada, the succes-
sor to Yamanouchi, right after he took office as  Chief Officer of the 
State-owned Steel Works at Yahata.  The plan was submitted as an 
“Opinion Paper” to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.  It in-
cluded the following recommendations:
1.   Because the demand for pig iron and steel has doubled since the 
Sino-Japanese War, it is recommended that the production of 
steel materials be doubled from the original plan, reaching the 
order of 180,000 tons.  “In the light of military as well as eco-
nomic requirements”, it is advisable to “expand the operational 
scale of the plant, introducing perfect and complete facilities, 
eliminating unnecessary expenses, and thus achieving a large 
volume of production at a low cost.”
2.   In response to the requirements of the emerging “steel era”, no 
wrought iron shall be produced at this plant.
3.   The initial period shall be divided into two phases.  In Phase I, 
the operation shall primarily be focused on the production of 
90,000 tons of ordinary steel.   Since the production of military 
grade steel is the “most difficult challenge” for the burgeoning 
steel industry in Japan, it is sensible to postpone its production 
until Phase II.
4.   In order to secure the stable and low-cost supply of raw materi-
als for the plant operation, it is recommended that iron ore and 
coal mines be acquired together with limestone quarries.
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In response to this “Opinion Paper”, an additional 6.5 million yen was 
injected in the budget, ensuring the total sum of 10.59 million yen for 
the Yawata  Works project.
Because the Yawata  Works intended to postpone the production of mili-
tary grade steel to Phase II, the Imperial Navy decided to construct a 
steel mill of its own in Kure in Hiroshima.  In 1890, prior to the out-
break of the Sino-Japanese War, the shipbuilding division of the Kure 
Navy Arsenal had already defined the construction of ironclad warships 
of the 10,000 ton class as their major objective.   It had been observed 
that the ironclad battleship “Zhen-yuen” of the Great Qing Navy Beiy-
an Fleet, captured during the Sino-Japanese War, was capable of repel-
ling all the shells fired at her, and was thus impervious to artillery at-
tacks.  The “supremacy” of the ironclad warship was unequivocally 
proved.  The Navy made utmost efforts to start production of armour 
plates for battleships at its own steel mill.  On the other hand, the Ya-
wata Works maintained its policy of manufacturing military grade steel 
materials at its plant.  In this context, when the Navy submitted its 
first budget draft to the Diet to endorse the increase in production ca-
pabilities at the Kure Navy Arsenal manufacturing plant, it was reject-
ed.  The budget was, however, approved in the following year, 1902.  In 
1906, nickel chromium steel armour plates were manufactured at Kure 
and mounted on warships.  In the meantime, there were heated debates 
in a series of Diet sessions about which supplier should assume the re-
sponsibility of manufacturing military grade steel materials.  The de-
bates resulted in a clear division of products between the Yawata Works 
and the Kure Navy Arsenal Works.  As far as military grade steel was 
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concerned, it was established that the Yawata Works should engage in 
the manufacture of pig iron, shipbuilding materials, cylindrical steel 
rods to be used as shells for rapid firing guns and materials for gun 
mounts.  On the other hand, the Kure Navy Arsenal Works was to man-
ufacture materials for gun barrels, artillery guns, torpedoes, shells, ar-
mour plates and gun shields.
Expansion from Noro's plan to Oshima's
Ohshima's 　　　　　　　
Noro's 　　　　First Stage 　Secondary Stage 　　　　
pig iron by blast furnaces
Iron and steel products
         Bessemer steel
         Open-hearth steel
         Wrought iron
         Crusible steel
43,000
60,000
35,000
20,000
4,500
500
120,000
90,000
45,000
45,000
−　
−　
240,000
180,000
The construction of the State-owned Steel Works at Yahata made 
progress.  Most of the building materials, equipment and machinery 
were purchased from Gutehoffnungshutte A.G. (GHH).  Those items 
were “of extremely high quality manufactured by German leading edge 
technology”.  Under the supervision of German experts, Japanese engi-
neers, operators and workmen engaged in the plant construction and 
machine installations.  The foreign engineering team hired for this 
project consisted of three consulting engineers plus 12 others including 
foremen and workmen.  The first Chief Adviser employed at the Yawata 
Works was the German Gustav Toppe.  After completing his contractual 
term as managing director in charge of engineering at the Han-yang 
Iron and Steel Works in China, he took the office of chief executive en-
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gineer at Yawata.  In 1898, German workmen were employed in plant 
construction as well as equipment installation.  In 1900, Carl Haase, a 
Pig Iron Department’s Chief Engineer, was employed to support the 
preparatory stage before the start up.  Hartmann Schmelzer, a Chief 
Engineer for the Product Department, was also employed at the same 
time.  The foreign engineers were highly paid.  Foremen and workmen 
were hired according to GHH’s recommendations. The German consult-
ing engineers and workmen had worked at many prestigious German 
steel plants, developing their skills and expertise in various production 
backgrounds.  Once the project started at the Yawata Works, however, 
innumerable problems surfaced.  It turned out that the foreign engi-
neers were reluctant to operate unfamiliar machines and equipment 
with which they had had no experience.  Not all of them possessed skill 
and expertise impressive enough to their Japanese counterparts.   Lin-
guistically and emotionally, they failed to achieve smooth and amicable 
communication with the Japanese project team, including workmen. 
In addition, there was conflict among the German engineers and work-
men themselves.  Trouble continued.  In order to resolve the situation, 
the foreign consulting engineers were fired in the end.  A Japanese 
managing director of engineering was nominated to manage the project. 
Under his leadership, general managers were appointed and assigned 
to supervising foreign foremen and workmen as well as Japanese.   In 
April 1901, Toppe and Schmelzer were fired before the completion of 
their contractual terms.  In April 1902, Haase was also fired before the 
end of his contract.
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Foreign Technical Personnel Engaged in Yawata Steel Works
Position Contractual terms dismissal
G.Toppe Chief Adviser 1897.12.1 〜 1901.12.1 1901.4.22
C.Haase Chief Enjineer of Pig iron Department 1900.3.15 〜 4 years 1902.4.14
H.Schmelzer Chief Enjineer of Rolling Mill Department 1900.6.8 〜 1904.3.31 1901.4.22
H.Lohberg Foreman of Machine Shop 1900.12.1 〜 1904.3.31 1904.2
W.Neuhauser Foreman of Blast Furnace Plant 1900.3.15 〜 1904.3.31 1902.8.10
H.Tummler Foreman of Middle Bar Mill and Sheet Mill Plant 1900.6.15 〜 1904.3.31 1903.9.30
W.Nalbach Foreman of Blooming, Rail and Large Bar Mill 1901.1.20 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
A.Westphal Foreman of Open-Hearth Plant 1901.2.1 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
J.Schmuch Foreman of Open-Hearth Plant 1901.3.27 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
G.Heuser Foreman of Middle and Small Bar Mill Plant 1901.3.27 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
C.Kohler Foreman of Middle and Small Bar Mill Plant 1901.4.22 〜 1904.3.31 1906.9.5 death
J.Bunse Foreman of Blast Furnace Plant 1901.5.31 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
T.Maurer Foreman of Bessemer Plant 1902.6.29 〜 1904.3.31 1907.3
A.Stoellger Foreman of Rolling Mill 1900.2.1 〜 1904.3.31 1904.3
P.Held Foreman of Blast Furnace Plant 1900.3.15 〜 1904.3.31 1900.9.28 disapperance
G.Neuhaus Worker of iron construction 1898. 〜 for finishing
N.Petto Worker of Rolling Mill ?
J.ReinMann Worker of Machine construction 1899.8.14 〜 for finishing 1900.6.30
E.Gysling Worker of Machine construction 1901.2. 〜 for finishing
As for iron ore materials, it had been planned that Akatani iron ore 
mine in Niigata, the acquisition of which was funded by using the addi-
tional budget, would be developed as a primary supply source. In sum-
mer 1898, however, Sheng Hsuan-huai, a Chinese businessman and 
politician, who was the head of Han-yang Iron Works, proposed a barter 
trade between Japanese coke and Chinese iron ore.  Consequently, a 
long-term purchase agreement was concluded with Sheng Hsuan-huai’s 
company, which secured an annual supply of 50,000 tons of Ta-yeh mine 
iron ore for the next 15 years.  As a result, the development plan for 
Akatani was abandoned.  This means that, at that point, Japan opted 
to depend on foreign sources for the supply of iron ore.  As to coal sup-
plies, the Yawata  Works acquired Takao coal mine and others at 
Chikuho in Kyushu, thus establishing the State-owned Futase Coal 
Mine.
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When it was expected that the construction work at the Yawata Works 
would soon be completed, an organisational change took place in Au-
gust 1900 to prepare for the start up.  The Pig Iron Department com-
prised the pig iron production division and the pig iron material divi-
sion.   The Steel Department comprised the converter furnace division 
and the open hearth furnace division.  The Rolling Mill Department 
comprised the steel bar & rod division and the steel sheet & plate divi-
sion.  The Japanese engineers who had been training in Germany re-
turned home around that time.  They were assigned to plant depart-
ments to lead daily operations.  In December 1900, “Workmen’s Work 
Rules” were set forth.  In the following year, large scale recruitment 
started for more than 1,000 workmen.  In February 1901, blow-in was 
accomplished at the No.1 Blast Furnace.  Because the coke furnace was 
not yet ready at the plant, coking coal was prepared on a commission 
basis by a nearby private sector factory before being fed into the blast 
furnace.  Immediately after start up, there were persistent failures. 
The operation gradually improved, however, becoming smooth around 
June.  After the blast furnace blow-in, the open hearth furnace started 
up at the end of May, followed by the start up of the converter furnace 
in November.  As for the rolling mill processes, the medium section and 
thin steel sheet rolling mills started up at the end of June.  These were 
followed by both the small section rolling and blooming mills.  A Bee-
hive coke oven was constructed at a rapid pace, and completed in Sep-
tember, which enabled the plant to secure in-house coke production. 
On November 18, 1901, a magnificent inauguration ceremony was held 
to celebrate the grand opening of “ The Imperial Steel Works “ at Ya-
hata.
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constructing No.1 Blast 
Furnace (1899)
constructing Railway (1901)
constructing Steel-waking Plant (1900)
(1901)
At the Yawata Works, especially in the blast furnace operation, things 
were “neither extremely bad, nor extremely good”.  A kind of sub-opti-
mal situation lasted for some time.  The worst period was recorded in 
February 1902, when, “due to low quality coking coal”, the blast furnace 
performed poorly in banking.  The “production of high quality coking 
coal” was urgently needed.  This sluggishness bottomed out afterwards. 
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In subsequent months, daily production reached the 100 ton level as 
compared to the design volume of 160 tons per day.  The bottom parts of 
converter furnaces were damaged and replaced several times.  Steam 
for driving the converter furnaces was not in sufficient supply.  In May 
1902, because of frequent system failures and downtime, the converter 
furnaces operated for only 16 days, one half of the total working days. 
The situation was similar for the rolling mills.  The supply of gas and 
steam to activate the mills was insufficient.  High priority was given to 
the continued operation of the blooming and rail mills.  As a result, the 
other mills with lower priority were operated only in the daytime, or 
subjected to an alternate on/off programme.  Even though the machines 
and equipment represented leading edge technology, they could not 
guarantee smooth operation.  Only when an organic coordination is in 
place between those facilities and supporting functions such as fuel 
supply, transportation and material handling, can a plant perform well. 
Moreover the immediate cause of such imperfections was a financial 
shortage.  As the funding deficiency became more and more evident 
around 1900, the management of the Yawata Works continuously peti-
tioned the government, asking for additional investment.  In December 
1901, with 20 to 30 percent of the works still unfinished, Tsunashiro 
Wada, then Chief Officer of the Yawata  Works , submitted a petition for 
an additional 3.9 million yen investment, so that construction could be 
continued.  Together with the petition, he submitted his resignation let-
ter.  His resignation was accepted by the government.  (Later, he took 
leave from his post, and was eventually dismissed with a disciplinary 
reprimand.)
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The petition for the additional budget was rejected in the Diet.  When 
Lieutenant General Yujiro Nakamura of the Imperial Army became the 
Chief Officer of the Yawata  Works in April 1902, the government set up 
a council called the “The Council of the Iron & Steel Production”.  Its 
purpose was to review and formulate a policy and measures for the 
drastic rehabilitation of the Yawata Works.  Furthermore, when the pig 
iron inventory reached the order of 30,000 tons in July 1902, the gov-
ernment ordered the suspension of the blast and converter furnace op-
erations for “operational and economic reasons”.  600 workmen involved 
with those furnaces were fired.  A recommendation was presented by 
the abovementioned “The Council”, which advised that, “in view of the 
current difficulties surrounding the Yawata Works, including con-
straints in relation to accounting rules and procedures, delay in con-
struction, an inconvenient commercial mechanism for trading activi-
ties, cumbersome procedures of financial calculations and others”, the 
project be transformed from a state-owned enterprise to a legal entity 
in the private sector.  The new organisation could be called the “Nippon 
Steel Company”.  The Council identified the “primary causes of poor 
performance and shortage of financial resources”.  It recommended that 
an additional investment worth 7.5 million yen be made.  The recom-
mendation stated that “as far as the future outlook of the iron and steel 
making enterprise was concerned, there should be no cause for concern, 
provided that proper management was exercised over the operation”. 
It concluded that “appropriate management should not be too difficult 
to achieve”, and that “the plant operation should not be economically 
unviable”. 
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This recommendation about proper management of the Yawata Works 
was not adopted by the government, however.  As for additional invest-
ment, the proposal was partly approved, allowing the Yawata Works to 
continue its remaining construction and installation work.  All mem-
bers of the senior management involved in the launching of the plant, 
including Michitaro Oshima, the main technical officials, were replaced 
(Oct. 1903).   The operation of the blast and converter furnaces re-
mained suspended.  Nevertheless, under the supervision of Kaichiro 
Imaizumi, general manager of the steel material department, progress 
was made to resume the converter furnace operation, into which, to-
gether with in-house produced pig iron, Kamaishi-sourced pig iron and 
some scrap iron were fed.  In 1904, the government expedited military 
development, in readiness for the anticipated outbreak of war.  Under 
those circumstances, the rehabilitation of the Yawata  Works was need-
ed, and additional funds were provided in the name of contingency ex-
penditure.  In Feb. 1904, immediately after the outbreak of the Russo-
Japanese War, Susumu Hattori, general manager of the pig iron 
manufacturing department, undertook to resume the blast furnace op-
eration.  At the end of March, all German foremen and workmen were 
fired except for the foreman of the converter furnace process.  In April, 
the blast furnaces were blown in by the Japanese team members only, 
marking the restart of plant operation.  However, the blow in had to be 
discontinued after only 17 days, because of banking.  Another problem 
was that slag was obstructing the tuyères and tapping holes of the blast 
furnaces.  After this failure, Kageyoshi Noro was invited as a special 
adviser to the Yawata Works, and　the management relied on his 
judgement concerning the integrity of the blast furnaces.
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After contributing to the drafting of the “Launch Plan of the State-run 
Steel Works” in the 1890’s, Kageyoshi Noro had experienced a setback 
in his subsequent career.  When corruption was revealed in relation to 
contracts for the purchase of water pipes for the Tokyo Metropolitan 
Water Board, his name was unfortunately included among those of the 
wrongdoers, entirely in error.  As a result, he had to resign from all 
public positions.  Subsequent to that incident, he came to engage in the 
iron-making industry in the capacity of “consulting engineer”.  He be-
came a special adviser to the Kamaishi Mines Tanaka Iron Works, 
making a significant contribution to the furtherance of their business. 
In Kamaishi, in 1900, he succeeded in Japan’s first production of man-
ganese pig iron and spiegeleisen.  In 1904, under his supervision, the 
construction of a third large blast furnace with a capacity of 60 tons 
was completed.  In the previous year, 1903, two Siemens-Martin open 
furnace process units were introduced, each with a capacity of 5 tons. 
He also reformed rolling mills, so that cylindrical, square and flat steel 
rods and bars could be manufactured.  Thanks to his endeavour, the 
Kamaishi Mines Tanaka Iron Works became Japan’s first private-sector 
integrated mill, manufacturing both pig iron and steel.  In 1900, he was 
also invited to take on the office of special adviser to the Hokkaido Coal 
Mining Railway Company.  In that capacity, Noro designed a coke facto-
ry, taking the lead in its construction.  Through this effort, he helped 
the company participate in the iron-making business.  In the coke 
project, he used charcoal dust, the products of which were successfully 
sold in the market.  In addition, Noro designed a blast furnace with a 
capacity of 20 tons to produce foundry pig iron from iron sand.  When 
he had completed this design task, he received the invitation from the 
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Yawata  Works.  All the experiences that he had accumulated as a “con-
sulting engineer” were to be fully capitalised on in his next career at 
Yawata.
Kageyoshi Noro took up office as special adviser to the Yawata  Works 
from May 1, 1904.  The general manager of the Pig Iron Department, 
Susumu Hattori, had been one of Noro’s students, when the latter was 
a professor at the Imperial University of Tokyo.  Hattori had prepared a 
document entitled “Report on Suspending of Blast Furnace Operating”. 
Based on the information in that report, Noro tried to discover the 
cause of the blast furnace failure.  His findings were as follows:
1.   The temperature at the blast furnace floor was lowered due to 
structural defects.  The area of the floor is too large when com-
pared with the air pressure inside the furnace.  The tuyères are 
also too large.
2.   Low quality coking coal has been used in the operation.
3.   A fundamental problem is that “foreign engineers and workmen 
have been in charge of operating the furnaces, although they 
have had no experience in dealing with Japanese raw materi-
als.”
Based on those findings, Noro reformed the blast design including 
tuyères and other parts.  He improved the coke blending ratios, raw 
material treatment and the design of the coke oven.  In July, he tried to 
expedite the bellows blowing process.  He understood that “the proba-
bility of further failure was not negligible”.  Since the work was carried 
out in a “season most unsuitable for blowing-in”, he faced tremendous 
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difficulties.  He tried every possible way to resolve the problems.  He 
arranged for new tuyères of small diameter within a very short period 
of time.  Eventually, he succeeded in resuming pig iron production. 
Consequent to that success, the operation improved steadily, and the 
blow-in of the No.2 Blast Furnace was accomplished in the following 
year.  Each unit managed continuous production, affirming the integri-
ty of the blast furnace technology executed at the Yawata  Works.
July. 23, 1904   3rd blow-in at No.1 Blast Furnace  ~  Jun. 2, 1910   Uninterrupted operation for 2, 140 successive days
Feb. 23, 1905   Blow-in at No.2 Blast Furnace (Reduction of size from 500m3 to 340m3) 
~  Jun. 7, 1911   Uninterrupted operation for 2, 295 successive days
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Yawata Works benefited from an 
additional investment coming from government contingency plan funds. 
Using those financial resources, the facilities were improved.  The man-
agement of the plant was determined to move forward.  The enterprise 
embarked on an initiative to accomplish 180,000 tons of steel material 
production per annum.  This had always been their aspiration since the 
inauguration.  To this end, “Phase I of Extension” project commenced. 
During the three fiscal years 1904 to 1908 - although, in fact, Phase I 
continued up until fiscal year 1909 - 10.88 million yen was invested in 
the construction of one more blast furnace.  This became No.3 Blast 
Furnace.  The investment encompassed the expansion of adjunct mills, 
the facilitation of transport systems and the construction of water chan-
nels from the River Onga to the plant site.  When these additional facil-
ities were complete, the Yawata  Works became fully fledged with high 
integrity.  There were three smelting furnace units, which produced 
168,000 tons per year.  As for coke ovens, there were 60 units of Koppe 
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type coke ovens producing 32,587 tons of coke and 150 units of Solvay 
type coke ovens producing 162,279 tons.  In total, slightly less than 
200,000 tons of coke was produced.  There were 11 basic open-hearth 
furnace units with a capacity of 25 tons each, producing 230,000 tons of 
steel per year.  There were 2 acid converter furnace units with a capaci-
ty of 10 tons each producing 150,000 tons of steel a year.  The Yawata 
plant had 2 blooming mills, from which 340,000 tons of steel ingots and 
billets were produced.  In other words, the Yawata  Works became a ful-
ly grown integrated mill that was capable of producing 180,000 tons of 
steel materials a year.  Included in the list of steel products manufac-
tured and supplied by the  Yawata  Works were conventional products 
such as 60 pound rails, large size steel products of not less than 8 inch-
es, I-beams, angle steel, channel steel and other shapes in steel, fish-
plates for rails, medium and small sized steel bars, steel plates, thin 
steel plates, corrugated steel sheets, bolts, nuts and steel outer rings. 
In addition to those conventional products, new ones were launched in 
the market.  The list includes 75 pound/80 pound rails manufactured at 
the rail mill, 30 pound/ 45 pound rails for mining operations manufac-
tured at the large size product mill, steel nails/steel wires manufac-
tured at the wire mill, thin steel plates of not more than 5 mm thick-
ness manufactured at the thin steel plate mill, universal-rolled open-
hearth steel manufactured at the open hearth furnace mill, tool steel/ 
high speed tool steel manufactured at the forging steel mill and special-
ity steel for gun barrels manufactured at the crucible steel mill.
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The State-owned Yawata Works Utilities, Establishment of 180,000 tons of Steel
Department Plant Main utilities 1901 1906 1911
Pig Iron
Dep.
Blast
Furnace
Plant
Rosting Furnace 20
Blast Furnace 1 58,000 2 102,000 3 168,000
Cowper's Hot Stoves 4 8 12
Blowing engines
Ore crusher
3 1,800 4 2,400 5
2
3,200
40
Coke Oven
Plant
Coal Washing machineries 2 237,250 3 355,875
Beehive 480 98,360
Haldy 90 43,362
Coppees System 60 32,587 60 32,587
Semet-Solvay 150 162,279
Productive Capacity per annum 98,360 206,890 194,866
Steel
Dep-
Open-hearth
Plant
Siemens-Martin Furnaces 4 60,000 8 150,000 11 230,000Gas Producers 6 17 24
Bessemer
Plant
Bessemer Converter 2 150,000 2 150,000 2 150,000Blowing engines 2 2 2
Mixer Plant Mixer 1 160Remelting Cupolas 3
Rolling
Mill Dep.
Blooming
Mill Plant,
No.1
Blooming Mill 1
100,000
1
100,000
1
100,000Rolling mill engine 1 1 1
Reheating furnaces 2 4 4
Blooming
Mill Plant,
No.2
Blooming Mill 1
140,000Rolling mill engine 1
Reheating furnaces 2
Productive Capacity of Crude Steel per annum 100,000 100,000 240,000
Rail mill Plant Rail Rolling mill 1 32,000 1 32,000 1 90,000Rolling mill engine 1 1 1
Rail and Girder
Finishing
Plant
Electric double straightening
Machines 6 64,000 6 64,000 6 124,000
Large Bar Mill
Plant Middle
Bar Mill Plant
Two high reversing 1 60,000 1 90,000
Three-high 3 36,000 4 36,000 4 36,000Reheating furnaces 2 2 2
Small Bar Mill
Plant No.1
Three-high for Roughing 1
21,600
1
21,600
1
21,600Double two-high for Finishing 4 4 4
Reheating furnaces 2 2 2
Small Bar Mill
Plant No.2
Three-high for Roughing 1
18,000Double two-high for Finishing 4
Reheating furnaces 1
Wire Rod Mill
Rolling mill 13
36,000Reheating furnaces 1
coiler 4
Thick
Plate Mill
Three-high 1
47,900Siemens Gas Producer 10
Siemens Reheating Furnaces 3
Sheet Steel Mill Sheet mill 11,000 18,000 23,200
Corrugat e Sheet Mill 1,800 2,700
Flat Sheet Mill 16,650 25,900
Bolt and Nut Mill 4,060 7,210
Productive Capacity of Steel Materials  per Annum 100,600 172,110 416,050
Special
Steel Mill
Dep.
Crucible
Steel Mill
Crucible melting fumace 8 ★ 3 ★★
Crucible melting fumace 1 ★ 1 ★
Crucible melting fumace 1 2t/11h
Forged
Steel Mill 14,240
Spring Steel Mill 300
Steel Wheels Mill 3,000
By-
Product
Dep.
Ammonium Sulphate Mill 2,000
Tar Mill 8,900
Fire-Brick Plant 10,200 10,800
Limeston e Plant 4,130 9,260
Slag Brick Plant 18,250
　　　Source: 25 Anniversary of The Yawata Steel Works, 1924
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The Yawata Works (1910)
Here let us look back at the way in which the Yawata Works was man-
aged between the end of the Meiji era and the beginning of the Taisho 
era, by examining specific production and sales activities which drove 
the enterprise toward its goal.
Consumption of iron ores (tons)
(prefecture) Includingron (％ ) 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910
Domestic Yanahara Okayama 55 13,549 1,574 0 7,780 651
Kawatana Yamaguchi 47 2,370 1,206 90 42
Kamaishi Iwate 60 3,507 778 0 0 4,468 2,975 3,086 2,388 2,385
Tosa Kochi 28 1,146 1,243 2,235
Ohuku 55 1,830 2,549 334 8,384
Abuta Hokkaido 53 426 3,343 4,298 4,466
Total including the others 17,056 2,352 0 0 4,468 17,888 13,423 6,686 8,626 10,625
China Tayeh 65 27,023 11,759 880 45,093 120,903 121,472 121,696 134,140 104,329 126,665
Korea Chaeryong 52 375 1,640 0 11,062 19,541 23,422 27,434 54,564
Unryul 55 296 28,631 42,242
Anak 53 27,749 55,433
Kenjiho 54 1,139
Total including the others 375 1,640 0 11,062 19,541 0 0 23,518 83,814 156,489
Total 44,454 15,751 880 252,174 144,912 139,360 135,119 164,544 196,774 293,895
　　　Source: Archives of the Yawata Steel Works
Initially, most iron ore used at the Yawata Works was imported from 
the Ta-yeh iron ore mine in China.  In 1909 and onward, however, the 
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volume of Korean iron ore increased considerably.  As a result, the Ta-
yeh materials accounted for less than 1/3 of the total in 1910.  The Ta-
yeh iron ore contained many iron compounds and a small quantity of 
silicate.  The problem was that the concentration of harmful elements 
such as phosphorus, sulphur and copper was also high.  For this reason, 
the grade of Ta-yeh iron ore was not satisfactory enough to fulfil the re-
quirements for Bessemer acid converter furnaces or basic open hearth 
furnaces.   In order to solve this problem, the management of Yawata 
launched an intensive and strenuous survey to discover better raw ma-
terial sources.  After the Japan-Korea Annexation, the Yawata Works 
placed both Unryul and Chaeryong　iron mines on the Korean Penin-
sula under its control.  Thus the company strengthened its commitment 
to exploring natural resources abroad.
Improvement of Coke Production
Production
(tons)
Adoption of Coke Ovens
Consump-
tion of
Coal
(tons)
Percenta-
ge of
Finished
Coke（％）
Cost per ton
Type Volumes(tons)
Inserting
of Coal
Per Oven
(tons)
Curboniz-
ing hours Coke
Raw
Materials
1900 3,280 Beehive 460 2 72
1901 54,253
1902 14,680
1903 −
1904 35,411
Haldy 90 4.8 36 〜 48
14.5
Coppee 60 4.8 48
1905 107,172 Coppee 60 8.2
1906 126,967 10.6
1907 121,739 Semet-Solvay 75 6 25 228,075 53.5 10.395 8.439
1908 108,638 Semet-Solvay 50 6 25 185,080 58.7 8.366 7.101
1909 136,756 Semet-Solvay 25 229,467 59.6 7.417 7.498
1910 153,291 266,235 57.5 7.985 8.101
1911 168,296 276,731 60.8 7.501 7.996
　　　Source: A 80-year history of the Yawata Steel Works
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Consumption of Coal for Coke
1905 1907 1911
tons （％） tons （％） tons （％） Yen per ton
Futase 153,128 75.25 140,440 61.58 200,000 65.8 3.85
Miike 31,382
23.91
37,862 16.6 22,000 7.2 4.90
Takashima 16,965 20,164 8.84 12,000 3.9 6.55
Sohda 25,966 11.38
Benxihu 12 40,000 13.2 7.73
K’ai-P’ing 30,000 9.9 5.85
Total including 
the others 202,169 228,071 304,000 4.74
　　　Source: A 50-year History of the Yawata Steel Works, Saegusa and Iida, A History of Japanese Mining
Thanks to the introduction of the Semet-Solvay coke oven (1907), which 
was designed to recover by-products deriving from the process, the pro-
ductivity of coke production significantly improved.  The volume was el-
evated, while the cost reduced.  By using the by-products from the ov-
ens, the Yawata  Works made inroads into the petrochemical industry, 
establishing a spin-off business, and thus generating additional profits. 
The breakdown of daily coke production per oven in those days indicat-
ed 0.5 tons from the Beehive oven, 1.5 tons from the Koppe oven and 2.6 
tons from the Semet-Solvay oven (7.2 tons from the Kuroda type).  The 
problem was that sub-optimal quality of coke had a negative impact on 
the pig iron making.  Coking coals were primarily supplied from the 
Futase coal mine in Kyushu, added to which were those from Miike and 
Takashima coal mines in Kyushu.  All of them had a high content of ash 
and volatile compounds, resulting in insufficient hardness and solidity. 
In order to improve the coke quality, the Yawata Works embarked on a 
new scheme in 1910, blending coals from Benxihu and K’ai-P’ing coal 
mines in China with Japanese coke.  Chinese coking coals had excellent 
caking properties.  If coke with a high ratio of residual ash and sulphur 
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is fed into blast furnaces, a larger amount of limestone has to be added 
to the pig iron making process, so that the sulphur from the coke as 
well as that from the iron ore can be properly removed.  However, an 
increase in the volume of limestone means a high operational tempera-
ture.  High temperature makes it more difficult to produce pig iron with 
a low silicon concentration. It should be understood that low silicon 
content is an essential condition for the successful operation of basic 
open hearth furnaces.
Production of Fire Bricks (tons)
Fire Bricks
Silica Clay Magnesium Total
1905 4,552 1,070 5,622
1906 3,818 3,103 30 6,951
1907 4,310 2,303 113 6,726
1908 4,783 2,966 388 8,137
1909 6,505 3,740 699 10,944
1910 6,062 5,933 470 12,465
1911 7,754 6,012 947 14,713
1912 8,217 6,681 856 15,754
It is often said that, “every time a certain volume of steel is produced, 
the furnace made of silica bricks is considerably damaged and melted. 
Therefore, good care has to be taken of furnaces.  Damaged sections 
should be repaired carefully with new silica bricks.”  As is clearly shown 
in this statement, the iron and steel making industry consumes a huge 
quantity of refractory bricks.  “At the Yawata Works, the volume of re-
fractory bricks accounted for about 15 % of the amount of steel prod-
ucts.”  In the steel making process at both the converter and open 
hearth furnaces, the bottleneck was that “the furnace walls and floor 
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were often seriously damaged and destroyed”.  To solve this problem, a 
dolomite factory was set up in 1901 using magnesium lime (bitter salts) 
supplied from the Tsunemi district of Moji in Fukuoka as raw material. 
It was already evident that no private sector company was able to man-
ufacture silica bricks of a quality to satisfy the refractory conditions 
necessary for iron and steel works.  For this reason, the Yawata Works 
had decided to depend on imported refractory bricks, and this practice 
had continued.  In May 1904, however, the company initiated the “pro-
visional manufacture” of silica bricks on their premises.  This decision 
was spurred by the discovery of the Akashiro Silica Stone deposits in 
Tsukumi in Kyushu.  The management of the Yawata Works invited 
Kotaro Takemoto, an experienced engineer from Mitsuishi in Okayama, 
to assist the project.  The result of this undertaking was that Japanese 
imports of silica stone completely ceased.  In fact, in-house production 
of refractory bricks for furnaces had an enormous impact on the plant 
management in terms of both production volume and product quality. 
When No.3 Blast Furnace was built, all the refractory bricks for its 
structure were made by the Yawata  Works itself.
Progress of Pig Iron Production
Volumes of
Blast
Furnase
Daily Production
per Furnase
(tons)
Consumption
Of Coke per
Pig Iron
(tons)
1901 1 82 1.63
1902 1 83 1.72
1907 2 132 1.13
1912 3 162 1.02
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Cost of Pig Iron in 1909 (yen)
Iron Ore Coke Limestone Energy Wage Reparation
Miscellane
ous
expenses
Total
Yawata 11.885 11.635 0.370 0.588 1.512 0.715 1.713 28.422
USA 14.600 7.780 0.860 0.240 1.540 0.680 2.323 28.020
　　　Source: Kageyoshi Noro
Cost of Pig Iron (yen per ton)
Yawata Kamaishi England Lorraine USA
1914 1922 1909 1922 Pre-thefirst war 1923
Pre-the
first war 1923
Pre-the
first war 1923
Total 21.1 37.8 26.6 55.8 32.1 43.1 19.6 27.7 28.3 54.2
Coke 7.0 19.1 16.8 29.5 8.8 14.2 11.1 18.2 8.2 21.9
Iron Ore 9.2 13.8 4.0 9.0 18.7 20.2 5.5 4.7 15.0 19.8
Wage 1.0 2.8 1.3 5.0 2.0 3.6 1.5 3.1 1.3 3.6
　　　Source: Tetuji Okazaki
After the rehabilitation programme, pig iron making at the plant in 
blast furnaces advanced steadily, to reach a level of 150,000 tons per 
year at the end of the Meiji era.  In 1908, the volume virtually reached 
full capacity.  A reliable indicator to measure the technological progress 
of a blast furnace is to see how much pig iron output is gained from one 
cubic metre of blast furnace structure after a 24-hour operation.  The 
record indicates outputs of 173 tons in 1902, 291 tons in 1905 and 339 
tons in 1908, evidencing a remarkable growth in the unit output of pig 
iron.  Likewise, coke consumption achieved “outstanding improvement” 
as well.  At the time of start up, the ratio of pig iron output to coke con-
sumption was 1 to 1.7.  It was down to 1 to 1.13 in 1907, followed by a 
further reduction to 1 to 1.02 in 1912.  As for the unit production cost of 
pig iron, the “achievement was truly impressive”.  While the unit cost 
was 37 yen per ton at the start up period, it was down to 28.42 yen in 
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1909.  In the same year, the average American production cost was 
28.02 yen.  The difference between the Yawata  Works and the Ameri-
can average was “only minimal”.  The progress was indeed remarkable. 
Despite such great success, however, the enterprise was still prevented 
from moving forward to further expansion.  The reason for this was 
that there was limited availability of raw materials in Japan, and that 
the Yawata  Works was still technologically lagging behind in some as-
pects of pig iron making.  Pig iron was used for the next stage of pro-
duction, that is, steel making.  The company did not have sufficient en-
gineering resources by which to produce pig iron with a low silicon 
content, a condition particularly critical for basic open hearth furnaces. 
Under these circumstances, the Yawata Works was forced to start im-
porting from the Han-yeh-p’ing Coal & Iron Company in China not only 
Ta-yeh iron ore but also Pingxiang coal.  Furthermore, later, it began to 
import pig iron produced by the Han-yang Iron & Steel Works as well.
As for steel making, a dramatic increase was recorded in steel ingot 
production, thanks to the contribution 
made by the basic Bessemer converter proc-
ess and the Siemens-Martin open hearth 
furnaces.  With regard to the former, ingot 
production was 1,394 tons in 1901, growing 
to 21,334 tons in 1904 and further advanc-
ing to 69,797 tons in 1908.  As to the latter, 
performance was also excellent, recording 
9,947 tons in 1901, 40,873 tons in 1904 and 
95,324 tons in 1908.The Converters (1900)
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Pig iron to be fed into converter furnaces was first treated in a metal 
mixer, completed in February 1907 at the Yawata Works.  Sulphur was 
removed through this treatment.  This process was to assure the uni-
form quality of pig iron.  Nevertheless, there was still excess phospho-
rus in the pig iron.  When it was used in the rolling mill process, prod-
uct quality was sub-optimal.  The quality of rails in particular was a 
serious problem.  In 1908, a duplex system was incorporated as a coun-
termeasure.  First, molten pig iron was partly decarbonised and refined 
inside the converter furnaces, after which it was desulphurised inside 
the open hearth furnaces.  There was a shortcoming 
Production of Steel-making
Products of Steel Ingot Converter's
Steel ingot for
Duplexprozess
(b)
Converter's
Steel ingot
(a＋b)Total Open-hearth Crusible Converter(a)
1901 11,341 9,947 1,394
1902 32,316 29,714 2,602
1903 42,265 42,265 −
1904 61,980 40,872 21,108
1905 86,848 44,284 208 42,356
1906 134,302 70,598 230 63,474
1907 141,877 78,212 91 63,574
1908 131,532 95,324 14 36,194 33,603 69,797
1909 157,720 119,566 138 38,016 37,214 75,230
1910 209,740 128,404 173 81,163 6,815 87,978
1911 233,459 149,460 284 83,715 10,417 94,132
1912 276,327 179,902 662 95,763 11,291 107,054
　　　Source: Iron and Steel Society of Japan A History of LD Converter in Japan
in this duplex method, however, in that one process took quite a long 
time, long enough to occupy an entire converting  cycle.  Only 35 proc-
esses or so could be accommodated within a day.  “The performance was 
far from satisfactory.”  Because of these limitations, the converter fur-
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naces performed only at 60 % capacity.  Noro wrote, “Even at this stage, 
the quality of pig iron has not improved enough.  This prevents the 
steel making at converter furnaces from performing better.”  Debate 
was under way among the engineers on whether or not the acid condi-
tion should be changed to basic to solve the problem.  It was even asked 
whether or not the process should be given up altogether.
The open-heath furnaces made “great progress” later, however.  The 
monthly production per unit was 621 tons at the start up period, while 
it grew to 814 tons in 1907.  The yield of good quality steel ingots ex-
ceeded 90 % as well.  In 1909, the monthly steel production exceeded 
10,000 tons, which enabled those people at Yahata “to recognise a fist 
bright sign for the future development of the steel making business”.
The Open-Hearth (1901)
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Progress of Operation at the Open-hearth
Volimes
Products of
Steel Ingot
(tons)
Monthly
Products per
oven (tons)
Consumed Coal
Per Steel Ingot
(tons)
Percentage of
Finished Steel 
Ingot（％）
Products per
Operation
(tons)
1901 2 9,946 621 721 83.0 19.2
1902 4 29,713 728 576 86.6 21.1
1903 4 42,264 880 552 85.1 21.9
1904 4 40,642 846 550 82.0 20.4
1905 5 44,284 785 535 82.1 21.0
1906 8 70,597 735 544 88.4 22.9
1907 8 78,212 814 455 91.0 22.0
1908 8 95,323 992 394 89.6 20.9
1909 10 119,430 1,080 413 89.5 21.6
1910 11 126,997 962 433 88.1 22.9
1911 12 145,954 1,039 395 90.0 23.0
1912 12 173,568 1,205 356 93.8 23.7
　　　Source: The Japanese Iron and Steel History; Meiji period
Demands of Steel Materials in Japan and Products at Yawata in 1911 (ton)
Import Domestic Total
Yawata
Products Supply
Bloom and Steel Ingot 4,512 495 5.007 496 454
Bars
130,413 68,252 198,665
37,577 39,779
Shaped Steel 21,517 18,990
Sheets and Plates 67,825 30,859 98,084 30,786 29,433
Tin Plates 25,367 0 25,367
Electric or Zinced Plates 43,564 2,134 45,698 2,134 2,327
Heavy Rails
89,516 65,993 155,509
61,139 59,902
Light Rails 4,855 3,366
Materials for Railway 4,050 6,286 10,336 6,565 6,236
Steel Wheels 1,140 1,237
Wire 29,450 8,186 37,636 8,186 7,378
Ribboned Steel 1,148 0 1,148
帯及箍（たが） 2,288 0 2,288
Wire-ropes 1,197 0 1,197
Pipes and Tubes 31,358 0 31,358
Nails 34,514 6,000 40,514
Materials for Building
Construction 17,134 0 17,134
鍛成品 530 458
Crucible Steel 108 90
Other 6,461 9,143
Total 482,336 188,205 670,541 181,494 178,795
　　　Source: 
Norikazu Shimizu：The Establishment of the State-Owned Yawata Steel Works (1)
―　　―144
Steel products grew steadily.  When the expansion project was conclud-
ed, the actual production reached 170,000 tons, which represented 98 % 
of the design full capacity 180,000 tons per year.  Thanks to the im-
proved steel ingot quality and progress in rolling mill processes, the 
loss ratio of materials between the crude steel stage and the final stage 
of steel products was reduced from 50 % at the start up to 36.7 % 
around 1908.  Nevertheless, engineers were still facing serious quality 
problems.  Quality issues were particularly obvious in rails manufac-
tured from the converter steel ingots.  “Strictly speaking, most rails 
manufactured by converter furnaces failed to satisfy the official quality 
standard”.  The Railways Bureau’s standard specified that phosphor 
contained in 60 pound and 75 pound rails be not more than 0.12 %.  Ya-
wata’s products did not fulfil that requirement.  Due to high contents of 
phosphor, the Bessemer steel of the Yawata plant was fraught with cold 
brittleness.  Since a large volume of air was blasted into the furnace 
during the deoxidization, porosity was caused by oxygen.  Cracks were 
also made.  “The status of state-run enterprise made the situation even 
more complicated.  Because it was state-run, the Yawata Works was 
obliged to follow the government policies and needs, contributing to the 
country.  It had to accommodate diverse orders from its clients, manu-
facturing a wide variety of products, sometimes in small volumes.  It 
was inevitable that the efficiency of rolling process stayed low.”
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